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TP  space estimation
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  elicit  homeowners’  willingness  to  pay  (WTP)  for energy  efficiency  and  low-carbon  tech-
nologies in  the context  of  heating  appliance  replacement.  We  employ  a within-between
subject  design  that  involves  manipulating  information  in  a two-stage  discrete  choice  exper-
iment (DCE)  and  use  WTP  space  estimation  to identify  the  role  of  financial  information  in
reducing  fossil  fuel  use.  We  find  that  homeowners’  average  valuation  of  energy  efficiency
exceeds  associated  heating  cost  savings,  suggesting  that  they  also  consider  non-monetary
benefits  when  evaluating  this  type  of  investment,  whereas  information  about  private  and
pro-social  benefits  of  investments  only  has  a limited  impact  on  WTP.  Evidence  also  suggests
that  homeowners  have  a  strong  preference  for the  existing  technology.  Consequently,  fossil
fuel users’  WTP  for switching  to low-carbon  technologies  does  not  cover  respective  invest-
ment cost  differentials,  and  we derive  evidence  on  how  combined  subsidies  and  information
can induce  these  users  to  opt  out  of fossil technologies.
©  2021  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).. Introduction
In the last two decades, low-carbon technologies have been at the center of global policy makers’ efforts to meet CO2
missions targets. Despite important public resources dedicated to foster private investment, however, adoption of low-
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arbon technologies is slow, and explanations generally point to market failures, behavioral biases, and modeling errors
see, e.g., Allcott and Knittel, 2019; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Gerarden et al., 2017). In the residential context, imperfect
nformation (Newell and Siikamäki, 2014; Allcott and Wozny, 2014; Jacobsen, 2015) and inertia (or status quo effects, see,
.g., Hartman et al., 1991; Banfi et al., 2008; Kwak et al., 2010) have been suggested to act as barriers to the uptake of novel
echnologies. While every building element requires renovation at some point (so that inertia eventually expires), a growing
ody of evidence shows that even during replacement decisions, homeowners prefer to adopt a familiar technology (Sopha
t al., 2010; Michelsen and Madlener, 2012, 2016). Because a large share of residential heating systems are based on fossil
uels,1 heating replacement decisions are critical, and empirical evidence is required to inform policies that incentivize
ow-carbon choices among fossil fuel users.
In this paper, we provide experimentally controlled evidence on how homeowners’ willingness to pay (WTP) for alterna-
ive heating systems are affected by information. In particular, we  design a discrete choice experiment (DCE, Louviere et al.,
000; Train, 2009) simulating a hypothetical scenario in which the respondent’s heating appliance needs replacement, and
hey can select between multiple alternatives described by varying degrees of energy efficiency (B, A, or A+, see Council
f European Union, 2013), different types of technology (heating oil, natural gas, wood pellets, or heat pump), and several
evels of investment cost.2 Participants reside in Switzerland and own  the single family home in which they live, allowing
s to focus on the relevant subset of the population which will face a replacement decision in the future. By contrast, apart-
ent buildings are excluded from the experiment due to the high prevalence of centralized heating systems, which would
ecessitate a different approach to preference elicitation.
The objective of our experimental design is to isolate homeowners’ preferences for the attributes of interest, and we
o so by considering a constrained replacement decision (no opt out) and experimentally fixing the level of comfort across
lternatives. In this context, the main contribution of this paper is to employ a two-by-two experimental design that combines
ithin- and between-subject variation in exposure to information (Charness et al., 2012). First, within-subject variation is
chieved by presenting participants two sets of DCE choice tasks with an information script in-between, an approach inspired
y the work of Allcott and Wozny (2014), Allcott and Taubinsky (2015). More specifically, after pre-treatment choice tasks,
ubjects are randomly assigned to a treatment intervention informing them about financial implications related to their
ecisions. We  focus on two aspects of the decisions: (i) private returns to investments (savings on heating costs), and (ii)
ro-social implications of choices (lower CO2 tax payments). Subjects then complete a second set of choice tasks, which
llows us to identify the impact of information on WTP  estimates. Our approach is also closely related to the work of Caputo
t al. (2017), who manipulate the presentation of DCE attributes in the middle of the choice task sequence.
The second source of experimental variation is between subjects and involves a control group and four treatment condi-
ions. Specifically, two of our experimental conditions focus on heating cost savings. We  inform homeowners that choosing
nergy label A+ instead of B (about 25% more energy efficient, see Council of European Union, 2013), reduces energy bills
y CHF 390 per year (exchange rate 2017 CHF 1 ≈ USD 1). Within these treatment conditions, we vary the degree of salience
f the information, which has been shown to be important in related contexts (Newell and Siikamäki, 2014; Sallee, 2014).
he other two conditions test homeowners’ reactions to tax-inclusive prices (as opposed to pure financial savings) by pro-
iding information about CO2 tax payments included in heating costs (the existing CO2 tax levied on fossil heating fuels in
witzerland amounted to CHF 84 per ton of CO2 in 2017, see Federal Council, 2012). Varying the salience of CO2 tax payments
llows us to contribute to a behavioral literature on salience in the context of externality-correcting taxes (see, e.g., Li et al.,
014; Houde and Aldy, 2017; Lanz et al., 2018).
Our second contribution is to provide evidence on homeowners’ preferences for the pre-existing technology, the one
hat is already installed at the time of the survey. A growing body of research finds that one of the key determinants of
omeowners’ choice is the familiarity with the technology (e.g., Sopha et al., 2010; Michelsen and Madlener, 2012, 2016).
ommon behavioral explanations include expectations about transition costs (switching technology is associated with an
xtra cost, Energieheld Schweiz, 2020), comfort (installing novel equipment takes time and requires changing one’s habits
f use, Michelsen and Madlener, 2012, 2016), and uncertainty with respect to future costs (see, e.g., Alberini and Bigano,
015). The design of our experiment allows us to document the importance of familiarity when these three aspects are
xed experimentally. More specifically, in our experiment up-front investment costs include possible extra transition costs
financial concerns), homeowners are asked to consider a replacement decision and that the new equipment meets their
eneral requirement in any case (comfort considerations), and we experimentally vary whether and how homeowners are
nformed about financial implications of their choices (informational biases).
1 In the U.S., 57.7% of all homes use natural gas as their main heating fuel (EIA, 2015). In the E.U., 43.1% of residential buildings are heated with natural
as,  and 14.0% with heating oil (based on Eurostat, 2017). In Switzerland, 39.4% of residential buildings are heated with heating oil, and 20.7% with natural
as  (FSO, 2017). Lang and Lanz (2020) show that compared to a number of other building retrofits, switching heating fuel is an effective CO2 abatement
trategy.
2 Stated preference studies allow independent variation of attribute levels and elicitation of WTP  for non-financial attributes, while at the same time
ontrolling information about available choice sets. However, they can also induce hypothetical and strategic biases. A randomized control trial would avoid
hese issues by eliciting revealed preferences, although in our setting it would be difficult to implement because of the substantial investment cost and
he  low replacement rate underlying the appliances we  consider. With this in mind, our experimental script employs a number of measures to encourage
articipating homeowners to disclose their true preferences (such as reminding them about budget constraints and consequentiality of choices, as we
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The third contribution of our work is to provide novel evidence that specifically focuses on how fossil fuel users can
e incentivized to select low-carbon technologies despite the aforementioned familiarity effects. This is important because
eating oil and natural gas are responsible for roughly a third of residential energy end-uses (IPCC, 2014), and homeowners
sing these energy sources are expected to deliver large CO2 emissions reductions in the coming decades. Moreover, since
ost homeowners wait until a particular building component reaches the end of its useful life to replace it (Achtnicht and
adlener, 2014), the comparatively long life span of heating appliances implies that homeowners are temporarily locked in
 particular technology (see, e.g., Rapson, 2014; Volland et al., 2020). In line with this, we employ the results from our DCE
o quantify how information affects WTP  for these homeowners, and estimate the size of a subsidy which would make oil
nd natural gas owners switch to either a wood-based heating appliance or a heat pump.
The experiment is administered to an online panel of 511 respondents each completing six pre-treatment and six post-
reatment DCE choices. We  find that homeowners’ pre-treatment WTP  for energy label A+ relative to label B amounts to over
HF 13,000, which is more than twice the expected gains from energy savings (about CHF 5850 for 15-year undiscounted,
017 energy prices). Our results further show that respondents’ valuations remain roughly unchanged even after they are
rovided with information about financial implications of their choices on heating costs. This suggests that a significant
roportion of respondents consider more than mere financial benefits when making efficiency choices, and imperfect infor-
ation about benefits of energy efficiency investments is not affecting choices in our sample. Importantly, this conclusion
lso holds for fossil fuel users, as average WTP  for this subgroup is also barely affected by information on heating costs.
By contrast, the results indicate that a significant share of homeowners is not willing to pay the investment cost dif-
erentials associated with low-carbon technologies. In particular, only about 40% (20%) of respondents are willing to pay
n investment cost premium of CHF 15,000 in exchange for a heat pump appliance (wood pellet-based boiler) instead of a
oiler operating on heating oil. We  show that this can be explained in part with a distinct preference for the pre-existing
echnology, which affects specifically the 75% of our sample that use fossil fuels (heating oil or natural gas). Lastly, DCE results
erived from the subsample of fossil-fuel users reveal that incentivizing fossil fuel users to switch to low-carbon alternatives
ould require a technology-specific subsidy of about CHF 6–10,000 for wood pellets, CHF 0–3000 for air source heat pumps,
nd CHF 24–28,000 for ground source heat pumps. While preferences for the pre-existing fossil-based technology prevail
ven after respondents are exposed to information about CO2 tax payments levied on fossil fuels, this type of intervention
an reduce the size of the subsidy necessary to opt out of fossil technologies. In particular, it has the potential to eliminate
he need for additional financial incentives increasing the attractiveness of wood pellets relative to heating oil.
Our findings complement a burgeoning literature that studies different dimensions of low-carbon technology adoption,
amely the role of costs (up-front and operative costs as well as various types of public funding, see, e.g., Alberini and Bigano,
015; Alberini et al., 2013), comfort (e.g., Bakaloglou and Charlier, 2019; Schleich et al., 2020), and ex-ante information (see
llcott and Greenstone, 2012; Lang and Lanz, 2021). We  also contribute to studies that challenge the importance of imperfect
nformation and inattention for energy efficiency purchase decisions (Allcott and Wozny, 2014; Jacobsen, 2015; Allcott and
aubinsky, 2015), and that emphasize the current type of equipment as a major determinant of future heating technology
hoices (see, e.g., Sopha et al., 2010; Michelsen and Madlener, 2012, 2016). Relative to existing studies, we find that the
reference for the familiar technology goes beyond comfort considerations and expectations about financial implications of
hoices. To our knowledge, this study is the first to shed light on the relationship between rigid preferences for the existing
echnology and the relative ineffectiveness of information programs in promoting economically sustainable valuations of
ow-carbon technologies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design, including the details of alternative informa-
ional interventions. In Section 3, we lay out how we estimate homeowners’ WTP  and the impact of information. Section 4
resents our results. A brief discussion and concluding comments are provided in Section 5.
. Experimental design
The objective of the experimental design is to quantify the impact of information treatments on homeowners’ preferences
or low-carbon technology and energy efficiency. The experiment includes three parts: (i) six pre-treatment DCE choice tasks,
ii) random assignment to one of four information treatments or the control group, and (iii) six post-treatment DCE choice
asks. In the following, we first provide details of the DCE tasks. Second, we discuss the design of our information treatments.
inally, we overview how we administer the experiment. A full set of screenshots of the material is provided in Appendix
.3
.1. Discrete choice experimentBefore starting the choice sequence, we ask participants to imagine that the primary heating appliance of their dwelling
equires replacement, and to consider which option would be preferred for their household. We  emphasize that, apart
rom what is mentioned explicitly, appliances perform equally well, meet general requirements, and are expected to have
3 The survey is available in German, French and English, and most respondents select one of the first two languages. All original versions are available
n  request.
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Fig. 1. Pre-treatment choice task.
he same operating life of 15 years. In addition, we  explain to homeowners that the installation of the new system would
ecessarily take place in the year of the survey (to avoid problems with discounting), and that none of the other components
f the heating system (e.g., radiators) would be affected.4 This allows us to mitigate heterogeneous expectations related
o comfort, so that we can provide a clean estimate of homeowners’ incremental WTP  for various technologies and energy
fficiency levels.
In order to reduce the potential for hypothetical and strategic biases encountered in the context of stated preferences,
e foster perceived consequentiality of choices with the use of scripts in line with the literature on truthful preference
evelation (e.g., Vossler et al., 2012; Newell and Siikamäki, 2014). To do so, we  explain to participants that it is in their
est interest to answer the questions truthfully as their answers will be used by academic research. Taking into account
nsights from the stated preference literature (see Johnston et al., 2017), we also make use of budget constraint reminders.5
inally, we start each choice sequence with an example to ensure that participants understand the choice tasks. The full text
xplaining the choice tasks to respondents is reported in Appendix A, Figs. A1 to A4 .
Subsequently, we ask subjects to consider a multi-dimensional choice between different heating appliances (see Fig. 1).
n particular, we ask them to choose from three unlabeled alternatives (Offers I, II, and III), each described by means of three
ttributes: (i) a standard energy efficiency label as mandated by the European Union, which at the time of the survey ranges
rom A++ (most efficient) to G (least efficient)6 ; (ii) the heating technology; and (iii) up-front investment cost.
Table 1 provides an exhaustive overview of attributes and levels applied in the experiment. In addition to being motivated
y previous literature, which shows that the chosen attributes matter in similar contexts (see Jaccard and Dennis, 2006;
carpa and Willis, 2010; Rouvinen and Matero, 2013; Stolyarova et al., 2015; Franceschinis et al., 2016; Ruokamo, 2016,
or heating technologies, and Newell and Siikamäki, 2014; Lang and Lanz, 2021, for energy labels), we select the range of
fficiency grades, technologies, and investment cost levels, to be in line with the options available on the local market at the
ime of the survey. In particular, our pre-treatment scenario reflects the fact that homeowners typically have to infer private
eturns (i.e., financial savings on energy bills) and pro-social implications of their choices (e.g., CO2 emissions) by relying
n the energy efficiency label and chosen technology (i.e., the energy source). Based on these attribute levels, we derived a
rst experimental design for the DCE experiment using D-efficiency criteria (Kuhfeld et al., 1994) and piloted the survey to
4 The exact wording is: “Aside from the specific characteristics of the appliances, please assume that they meet your general requirements, perform
qually well, and are expected to have the same operating life of 15 years,” and “When making your choices, please assume that the change of appliance
ill  necessarily take place in 2017. The selected heating appliance would fully replace your current heating appliance, but the rest of your heating system,
uch  as the radiators, would not need to be changed.”
5 We  include two separate budget reminders: “Some of the following questions will involve costs to your own  household; please give careful consideration
o  how these costs would affect your financial budget,” and “In making your choices, please remember that any money spent on your heating will not be
vailable for other expenses by your household. The only right answer is what you would really choose.”
6 As of 2019, the energy efficiency classes for heating systems range from A+++ to D. Classes E and G no longer apply, as such inefficient technology is no
onger allowed to be sold (see Council of European Union, 2013).
4
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Table  1
Discrete choice experiment attributes and levels.
Attribute Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Energy label B A A+ – –
Heating technology Boiler with heating oil Boiler with natural gas Boiler with wood pellets Heat pump using electricity –
Investment cost CHF 10,160 CHF 13,010 CHF 17,030 CHF 23,090 CHF 30,140
Notes: Attribute levels for the labels, technologies, and prices are in line with options available on the market at the time of the experiment. Energy label
A  represents an approximate 10% improvement in energy efficiency relative to label B, and label A+ an approximate 25% improvement (see Council of
European Union, 2013). We use a fractional factorial design based on D-efficiency for the pilot and a Bayesian criteria in the main survey. 2017 exchange
rate  CHF 1 ≈ USD 1.
Table 2
Overview of informational treatment and control interventions.
Indicator Treatment name Information screen post-treatment choice task
C Control Neutral Pre-treatment design
TA Heating cost Heating cost Pre-treatment design
TB Heating cost salient Heating cost Pre-treatment + annual heating cost
TC CO2 tax CO2 tax Pre-treatment design































otes: In each treatment group, subjects go through six pre-treatment DCE tasks before being exposed to one of five information treatments. After the
nformation screen (and related quiz question), they either go through another sequence of six “pre-treatment” DCE tasks (conditions C, TA , and TC ) or some
ariation of it (conditions TB and TD).
nsure that they yield meaningful options for respondents. After the pilot, we revised the DCE experimental design for the
ain survey using Bayesian D-efficiency criteria.
Importantly, our experimental design focuses on energy labels A+, B, and A (see Table 1), which are arguably the most
ommon classes relevant for our survey. By contrast, label A++ was excluded because it was not issued for oil boilers without
dded solar panels, whereas A+++ did not exist for either of the technologies considered in our experiment at the time of
he survey. Note that switching from energy label B to label A corresponds to an approximate 10% improvement in energy
fficiency and from B to A+ reflects an approximate 25% improvement (see Council of European Union, 2013).
Our experiment includes four different heating technologies available on the market at the time of the experiment (see
able 1), two of which are typical fossil fuel-based technologies (boiler with heating oil and boiler with natural gas). The
ther two can be considered as renewable energy sources in Switzerland (boiler with wood pellets and heat pump using
lectricity).7 In order to generate heat, a boiler warms up cold water by combusting the respective fuel, while a heat pump
ulls heat from the surrounding environment (i.e., air, water, or ground). At the time of the survey, these four technologies
ake up about 88% of Swiss households’ primary heating appliances (FSO, 2019a).
Up-front investment cost levels included in the final experiment range from CHF 10,160 to CHF 30,140 (see Table 1),
hich mirrors actual prices in the local market at the time of the survey (2017 exchange rate CHF 1 ≈ USD 1). Specifically,
he price for a new boiler operating on heating oil ranges from CHF 18,500 to CHF 30,000 in Switzerland. The cost for a new
as boiler ranges from CHF 14,000 to CHF 27,500, for a new wood pellet boiler from CHF 30,000 to CHF 42,000. Lastly, a new
ir source heat pump ranges from CHF 29,000 to CHF 42,000, and a new ground source heat pump from CHF 43,000 to CHF
5,000 (Energieheld Schweiz, 2020; EnergieSchweiz, 2020).8
.2. Informational interventions
Table 2 summarizes the five treatment conditions to which respondents are randomly allocated after completing the six
re-treatment choice tasks. Each condition consists of an information screen plus the six subsequent post-treatment choice
asks. All information screens closely mirror each other in design, structure, complexity, and length, so that only the actual
nformational content should affect homeowners’ decisions (see Figs. A9 to A11).
In order to foster effective transmission of information to respondents, we  take two specific steps inspired by Allcott and
ozny (2014) and Allcott and Taubinsky (2015). On the one hand, interventions include both verbal and visual (i.e., a figure)
nformation. On the other hand, we trigger homeowners’ attention by announcing upfront that each information screen will
e followed by a short quiz question testing comprehension of the core information of the information screen. Participants
eed to answer the quiz question before being able to continue the experiment (when homeowners answer incorrectly, the
ight answer is displayed). 83% of homeowners in our sample answered the quiz question correctly.
After completion of the quiz question, homeowners receive instructions for the set of post-treatment choice tasks. In
ome treatment conditions we modify the choice task design in order to reinforce salience of the information provided. As a
7 Electricity generation in Switzerland mainly derives from hydro (56%) and nuclear (35%) power (SFOE, 2019).
8 Note that we chose to randomly increase each of the selected investment cost levels by <2% in order to avoid round numbers and make prices look
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esult, participants either face the same choice tasks as they did before treatment, or a marginally modified version of them
see Table 2). In the following subsections, we detail our various control and treatment conditions.
.2.1. Control group (C)
Our within-subject treatment design gives rise to a number of potential time-variant factors commonly associated with
epeated choices (such as learning and fatigue, see e.g., Day et al., 2012; Campbell et al., 2015). These factors are unrelated to
he specific information content of our treatments, and should be disentangled from treatment effects. The neutral control
nformation allows us to control for a general time trend.
The control group receives neutral information that is designed not to affect homeowners’ choices, while not appearing
s completely out of context. Specifically, respondents are provided with information detailing the age of the Swiss building
tock (information screen Neutral, Fig. A9). After completing the one-question quiz, participants face a new series of six
hoice tasks designed similarly as the ones in the pre-treatment sequence (see Fig. 1).
.2.2. Information about energy efficiency and heating costs (TA and TB)
Treatment groups TA and TB are shown an information screen about expected annual heating costs associated with
ppliances of different energy efficiency grades (information screen Heating cost, shown in Fig. A10). This allows testing the
mportance of specific financial information for investors’ choices. The information screen conveys an average expenditure
f CHF 1710 per year for a standard appliance with efficiency label B and CHF 1320 per year for the more energy efficient
lternative with efficiency label A+, which roughly translates to the 25% improvement in energy efficiency that can be
xpected when switching from label B to A+ (see Council of European Union, 2013).9
Treatment conditions TA and TB provide the same information screen (and quiz question), but they differ in the design of
he post-treatment choice tasks. Homeowners in treatment group TA face the same choice set design as before treatment,
o that post-treatment WTP  from this group allows measuring the effect of the information screen about heating costs on
omeowners’ valuations of different energy efficiency grades. Conditional on respondents not already being fully aware of
nancial savings associated with energy efficiency prior to the intervention (both financial and energy literacy have been
eclared barriers to energy efficiency investments, see Blasch et al., 2019; Brent and Ward, 2018), we expect treatment TA
o increase respective WTP  as compared to before the treatment. This treatment is labeled Heating cost.
Homeowners in treatment group TB, labeled Heating cost salient,  complete a post-treatment choice task which explicitly
isplays an estimate of heating costs associated with each alternative (see Fig. 2). The displayed heating costs do not constitute
n additional attribute as such, but rather an extension of the energy efficiency grade (irrespective of other attributes). This
ormat is conceptually similar to U.S. energy efficiency labels for water heating systems studied by Newell and Siikamäki
2014). Concretely, alternatives containing efficiency grades B, A, and A+, are associated with annual heating costs of CHF
710, CHF 1530, and CHF 1320, respectively, which is consistent with the preceding information screen. Reminding subjects
bout implications of energy efficiency for future heating costs during choices increases salience of the informational content,
nd can thus be expected to reinforce the informational intervention. If salience matters in this context, we would expect
ost-treatment WTP  for energy efficiency to be higher in treatment group TB than in treatment group TA, i.e., WTP
label(TA) <
TPlabel(TB).
.2.3. Information about technology choice and carbon tax payments (TC and TD)
Information treatment groups TC and TD aim at conveying public good considerations in the form of environmental
mplications of technology choices. This is achieved with an information screen about the carbon tax levied on heating fuels
n Switzerland and its implications on heating costs (information screen CO2 tax is shown in Fig. A11). At the time of the
xperiment, the tax amounts to CHF 84 per ton of CO2 (Federal Council, 2016), and is imposed on all fossil heating and
rocess fuels (mainly oil and natural gas, see Federal Council, 2012). Payments are claimed on fuel invoices (in addition to
he VAT), and the tax increases over time, so that the cost associated with fossil-based heating increases as well (Federal
ouncil, 2016). Importantly, respondents are informed that low-carbon technologies (wood pellets and heat pumps in our
etting) are not taxed, signaling that they are less harmful to the climate.
Treatments TC and TD again differ in terms of whether or not the CO2 tax information is displayed in the post-treatment
hoice task. In treatment TC , participants face the pre-treatment choice task design reported in Fig. 1, and post-treatment
TP of this group allows us to measure the effect of the information screen about CO2 tax payments on homeowners’
aluation of different heating technologies. Conditional on respondents not having been fully aware of tax implications
ssociated with different technology choices (a substantial portion of Swiss residents have a poor understanding of the CO2
ax, see Burger et al., 2018), we expect treatment T to increase WTP  of low-carbon technology choices as compared toC
efore the treatment. This treatment is labeled CO2 tax.
In treatment TD, the post-treatment choice tasks integrate financial information about both energy expenditures and
nclusive CO2 tax payments. We  label this treatment CO2 tax salient,  and an example of the subsequent decision task is
9 Heating costs can be expected to fluctuate across dwellings and over time, and previous literature shows that raising subjects’ awareness to uncertainty
f  future energy savings dampens their valuation of these savings (Alberini and Bigano, 2015; Lang and Lanz, 2020b). The specific numbers used in our
xperimental interventions merely support our objective of quantifying how information on financial savings affects homeowners’ WTP.
6
























Fig. 2. Post-treatment choice task with heating costs (TB).
hown in Fig. 3. The tax level does not provide separate information as it is a function of both the respective heating
echnology and the energy label. In particular, for energy efficiency grade B, the annual heating costs (CHF 1710 as per
bove) include CHF 550 in CO2 tax payments for heating oil and CHF 320 for natural gas. For efficiency grade A, the heating
osts (CHF 1530) include CHF 490 in taxes for heating oil and CHF 290 for natural gas. Finally, for efficiency label A+, the
eating costs (CHF 1320) include CHF 420 in taxes for heating oil and CHF 250 for natural gas. Boilers operated with wood
ellets and heat pumps using electricity are not taxed. If salience matters for the formation of homeowners’ preferences
egarding CO2 tax payments, then post-treatment WTP  for both energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies of treatment
roup TD should be higher than corresponding post-treatment WTP  in treatment group TC , i.e., WTP
label(TC ) < WTP
label(TD)
nd WTPtech(TC ) < WTP
tech(TD).
Note that we measure subjects’ reactions to tax-inclusive prices, so that comparing treatment conditions TB and TD
rovides clean evidence about whether the information about CO2 taxes affects WTP. If environmental motives play a role
n the formation of homeowners’ preferences, we would expect respondents’ post-treatment WTP  for more efficient (fossil




We  script our DCE with Qualtrics and field it in April–May 2017 as part of a wider online survey on energy consumption
y households in Switzerland (Weber et al., 2017). Respondents are drawn from an online pool of subjects managed by a
rivate survey company (Intervista), which holds over 90,000 subscribers at the time of the survey. Subjects are contacted
y email and participation is encouraged with vouchers (equivalent to CHF 6 for completion of the full survey).10 Out of
015 subjects that participate in the wider study, a total of 511 homeowners are randomly assigned to our experiment.Restricting the sample to homeowners implies that we survey a relatively old and wealthy minority of Swiss households.
owever, it also allows us to focus on respondents with the authority to make heating replacement decisions independently.
ased on this, the experiment covers owners of detached (60%), semi-detached (22%), and terraced houses (18%), and we
10 The neutral e-mail invitation states: “Dear Sir or Madam, we have the pleasure to invite you to participate in a new Intervista survey. With a click to
he  link below you can access the survey directly. If you are part of the target group and complete the survey integrally, you will receive 60 bonus points.
nswering the survey will take about 30 min  of your time. We wish you a lot of fun answering this survey! Kind regards, your Intervista team.” The response
ate  is approximately one third.
7























Fig. 3. Post-treatment choice task with heating costs and CO2 tax (TD).
xclude apartment owners from the experiment because of the high prevalence of centralized heating systems across multi-
nit apartment buildings in Switzerland. In such a setting, heating replacement decisions generally result from a vote, which
ould make our elicitation approach highly hypothetical. While homeowners represent a small share of Swiss households
23% live in single family homes, see FSO, 2020), we note that single family homes make up 57% of the residential building
tock (FSO, 2020). Importantly, and in part due to the larger share of exterior walls, single family homes emit about 40%
ore kg CO2/m2 compared to apartment buildings (Wüest Partner, 2020).
The fact that our respondents are drawn from a panel of subscribers means that our sample is not completely ran-
om, but the survey company handles representativeness. In terms of average observable characteristics (see Table B1,
ppendix B), our sample is in line with figures from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) on the Swiss population of home-
wners (FSO, 2019b,c) for age (56 years in our sample compared to 57 years in Switzerland), high-education groups (44%
f our sample completed tertiary education against 37% in Switzerland), and income (CHF 6000–8999 compared to CHF
029 in Switzerland). The fact that our sample includes larger dwellings (172 m2 compared to 138 m2 in Switzerland) with
igher annual heating costs (CHF 1920 against CHF 1042 in Switzerland) is likely due to the fact that official statistics for
witzerland include apartment owners. As compared to the general population of Swiss residents (FSO, 2019a), respondents
n our sample more frequently heat with heating oil (47% compared to 39% in Switzerland) and natural gas (29% compared
o 21% in Switzerland).11
In Table B2 of B, we summarize treatment randomization across conditions. The average number of respondents per
ondition is 102, and the minor differences across groups are due to a small number of subjects that did not complete all of
he experiment.
. Econometric framework
Our econometric framework is based on standard Random Utility Theory (McFadden, 1974, 1984), which assumes that
tility for a particular product is derived from its characteristics (attributes). In turn, observed choices reveal which set
f attribute levels provides them with the highest utility (among a set of alternatives). Formally, individual n’s utility for
lternative j in choice situation t, called Unjt , is separated into a deterministic component Vnjt and an unobserved stochastic
11 Our sample also covers households heating with heat pump (11%), electricity (9%), and wood (5%). Census data on the distribution of Swiss homeowners’
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omponent εnjt so that Unjt = Vnjt + εnjt . As is customary in the literature, we assume that εnjt is independently and identically
istributed according to a Gumbel distribution (McFadden, 1974).
In choice situation t, respondent n selects alternative j which is assumed to reveal a utility-maximizing option:
njt > Unit (∀ j /= i). In our setting, individual n is asked to choose 12 times (t ∈ 1, 2, . . ., 12) from a set of three alter-
atives (j ∈ 1, 2, 3), here replacement heating appliances, each described by three attributes of varying levels (see Table 1).
mportantly, t ∈ [1,  6] indicates observations before treatment, and t ∈ [7,  12] indicates observations after treatment. Then,
he deterministic portion of utility before treatment Vpre
njt
can be expressed as follows:
Vpre
njt




njt + ˇgasn gasnjt + ˇwoodn woodnjt + ˇpumpn pumpnjt + ıncostnjt (1)
here labelAnjt and label
A+
njt are energy label indicators, gasnjt , woodnjt , and pumpnjt are heating technology indicators, and costnjt








n ) and ın are the
arginal utility parameters of interest measured for choices before treatment. More specifically, the coefficients ˇAn and ˇ
A+
n
re measured relative to the reference category label B, while the coefficients ˇgasn , ˇwoodn , and ˇ
pump
n are measured relative
o the reference category heating oil.  Note the absence of an alternative specific constant for opt-outs as we  consider a
eplacement decision and respondents are not allowed to stay without a heating appliance.
In order to identify the effect of our informational interventions on post-treatment choices, while at the same time
ontrolling for the effect of the placebo intervention, we interact each attribute with a post-treatment indicator denoted
t equal to one if t ∈ [7,  12], zero otherwise, as well as a set of treatment-specific indicator variables Tkn equal to one if
ndividual n is assigned to treatment group k (k ∈
{
A, B, C, D
}
























here the set of n parameters accounts for potential changes in the control group (C) during the post-treatment period, and
he vector of coefficients in nk represents average treatment effects on utility. More precisely, nk evaluates the incremental
ffect of each treatment condition (i.e., TA, TB, TC , and TD) relative to the control intervention C.
We further model choices directly in WTP  space, which allows making assumptions regarding the distribution of WTP








here the notation follows from above, and all pre- and post-treatment choices are jointly considered in the estimation. The
negative of the) marginal utility of income ın multiplies all the coefficients of interest (ˇn, n and nk), so that the resulting
stimates can directly be interpreted in WTP-space. This particular set of coefficients is labeled WTPn .
Next, we make a number of assumptions about the mixing distribution of tastes and WTP  in our sample, denoted f (WTP |
), where  refers to the parameters of the distribution to be estimated from the data. First, we pragmatically follow the
ajority of the literature in assuming that ˇn are normally distributed, whereas ın is log-normal.13 Second, we assume that
aste heterogeneity is not affected by the treatment interventions, and that these only shift the mean of the distribution.
oncretely, we only estimate the average for n and nk, and do not estimate the standard deviation separately.14
Individual choice probabilities are based on a mixed logit (MXL) model (Revelt and Train, 1998; McFadden and Train,













f (WTP | )dWTP12 Alternatively, modeling in preference space requires assuming a distribution for the separate coefficients and deriving WTP  for changes in a particular
ttribute as the ratio of the attribute coefficient and an estimate of the marginal utility of money. This can lead to WTP  distributions that are heavily skewed
nd  that potentially do not have well-defined moments (Train and Weeks, 2005; Hole and Kolstad, 2012).
13 Semi-parametric approaches can be used to identify more flexible distributions of tastes (i.e., multimodal and asymmetric distributions, see Train, 2016;
ansal et al., 2018a,b; Bazzani et al., 2018; Caputo et al., 2018; Scarpa et al., 2020). Sample size limitations and difficulties with numerical convergence
revent us from implementing these approaches. For the same reason, taste parameters are assumed to be uncorrelated.
14 Our empirical investigations with the data confirmed that the standard deviation estimates do not differ significantly across pre- and post-treatment
hoices. We  therefore prefer a more parsimonious specification where treatment indicators are allowed to shift the empirical distribution of WTP.
15 The alternative multinomial logit (MNL) model cannot accommodate random preference heterogeneity and imposes heavy structure on the data due
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iven that the MXL  choice probabilities have no closed-form expression, the parameters are estimated via simulated maxi-
um  likelihood (Train, 2009). In particular, we approximate the choice probabilities based on R = 2000 Halton draws, and





















here WTP[r]n refers to the r-th draw for individual n from the distribution of WTP .
Based on the estimated distribution of WTP  in our sample, we then use the method of Revelt and Train (2000) to simulate
ndividual-level WTP  parameters ̂WTPn . More precisely, we  calculate individual-specific WTP  parameters by conditioning on


































here WTP[r]n refers to the rth draw for individual n from the estimated distribution of WTP , and we  again set R = 2000
alton draws.
Finally, as mentioned previously, we apply the above framework both to our full sample of homeowners and to the
ubsample of homeowners who use fossil fuels. In particular, we estimate Eq. (3) separately for households that heat their
wn house with either heating oil or natural gas. Based on MXL  model results, we  then predict choice probability in order
o quantify the monetary amount that would make these users switch to one of the renewable technologies (wood or heat
ump).
. Experimental results
This section reports the main results of our analysis. We  first provide evidence on homeowners’ WTP  for energy efficiency
nd heating technologies, and exploit within- and between-subject variations in information disclosure to identify the impact
f information on subjects’ WTP. We  then provide evidence about preference heterogeneity for homeowners with different
re-existing technologies. Finally, we focus on the subsample of fossil fuel users and derive implications about how these
omeowners select renewable technologies, either through information or through financial incentives.
.1. Mixed logit model of homeowners’ WTP
Table 3 reports our main MXL  model results in WTP  space. Columns (1) and (2) provide respectively mean and standard
eviation estimates of the WTP  distribution (in thousands CHF) for energy label (A and A+ indicators relative to B) and heating
echnology (natural gas, wood pellet, and heat pump indicators relative to heating oil), as well as the underlying estimates for
he investment cost variable. Column (3) reports the average effect of the control intervention on individuals’ WTP. Columns
4–7) show the effect of each informational intervention on respondents’ average WTP  net of the impact of the control
ondition (see Eq. (2)). We  report standard errors clustered at the respondent-level in parentheses.
Estimates from columns (1) and (2) show that pre-treatment average WTP  for energy label A and A+ are positive and
ighly statistically significant, with point estimates equal to CHF 7970 and CHF 13,250 respectively (2017 exchange rate CHF
 ≈ USD 1). WTP  estimates for technologies indicate small and statistically insignificant mean estimates for boilers operating
n natural gas or wood pellets relative to heating oil, whereas mean WTP  for a heating appliance powered by a heat pump
sing electricity is around CHF 10,350. The investment cost variable is negative and highly statistically significant, indicating
hat respondents traded-off attributes and the cost as expected.
Our results also show that all standard deviation estimates are highly statistically significant and relatively large in
agnitude. This indicates substantial heterogeneity in WTP  across respondents. We note that heterogeneity is particularly
ronounced for alternative technologies, where the standard deviations exceed the mean estimates by a large margin, and
uggest that a fraction of respondents hold negative WTP  for some of the technologies. This is illustrated in Fig. 4, which
isplays boxplots of simulated individual-specific WTP  for all attributes both before treatment and, separately for each
reatment condition, after treatment. Specifically, panel (c) shows that before treatment about 50% of homeowners in our
ample are unwilling to pay a premium in exchange for a boiler operating on natural gas relative to heating oil. Moreover,
nly about 40% (20%) of respondents are willing to pay an investment cost premium of about CHF 15,000 in exchange for
10
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Fig. 4. Distributions of simulated individual-specific WTP  by treatment status. Notes: The boxplots summarize the distribution of simulated individual-
specific WTP  before and after treatment, where the latter are conditioned on treatment conditions. The lines in the box represent the 25th, 50th and 75th
percentile, while the whiskers extend to include lower and upper adjacent values to the respective quartiles. 2017 exchange rate approx. CHF 1 = USD 1.
11
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Table  3




Interaction effects (post-treatment estimates)
Mean Std. dev. Post Heating cost Heating cost salient CO2 tax CO2 tax salient
×Pt ×Pt · TA ×Pt · TB ×Pt · TC ×Pt · TD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Energy label A 7.97*** 9.10*** 1.03 −4.00* 1.64 −6.21** −1.89
(0.92) (0.76) (1.40) (2.06) (2.02) (2.73) (2.13)
Energy  label A+ 13.25*** 10.28*** 2.33 −0.59 4.40** −5.16*** −1.24
(1.15) (1.06) (1.54) (2.69) (2.06) (1.92) (2.38)
Natural gas 2.98 21.73*** −1.74 1.38 −0.64 0.70 1.54
(3.52) (2.03) (2.68) (2.96) (2.74) (4.08) (3.38)
Wood  pellets 0.01 20.56*** −1.99 4.32 3.99 4.41 5.99
(3.06) (1.86) (2.14) (3.64) (2.55) (2.98) (3.93)
Heat  pump 10.35*** 21.39*** 1.21 0.02 −2.76 4.48 −0.04
(1.64) (1.57) (1.82) (2.63) (2.78) (3.32) (2.68)
Investment cost −1.55*** 0.56*** – – – – –







Notes: MXL  estimation for the full sample of homeowners reported. Column (1) reports pre-treatment mean WTP  estimates (in thousands CHF), and column
(2)  displays corresponding standard deviation estimates. Reference categories for the energy labels (A, A+) and the technology variables (natural gas, wood
pellets, heat pump) are energy label B and heating oil, respectively. Column (3) reports (mean) interaction effects of each attribute with a post-treatment
indicator variable. Column (4) reports interaction effects of each attribute with a post-treatment indicator specific for treatment condition TA (=1 if the
choice  is made after being subject to treatment condition TA). Columns (5–7) report interaction effects for treatment conditions TB , TC , and TD , respectively.
2017  exchange rate CHF 1 ≈ USD 1. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent-level and reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical






















n air source heat pump (wood pellet-based boiler), and less than 10% consent to invest an extra CHF 40,000 in a ground
ource heat pump (see panels d and e).16
Turning to post-treatment results, column (3) shows that on average the placebo intervention (C) had no statistically
ignificant impact on respondents’ WTP. This suggests that the within-subject design generates WTP  evidence that remains
table despite time-varying factors such as learning and fatigue. However, this is also true for most treatment interventions,
s apparent in Fig. 4. More specifically, column (4) shows that the impact of treatment condition TA is marginally significantly
egative on the WTP  for energy label A, and near zero for label A+. When financial implications are made salient during the
hoice tasks (condition TB, column 5), WTP  for energy label A increase by CHF 1640 on average (p-value > 0.1), and by CHF
400 for label A+ (p-value < 0.05)
Importantly, both pre-treatment and post-treatment WTP  of conditions TA and TB bunch around CHF 15,000 for energy
abel A+ relative to B (see Fig. 4). As a result, WTP  is more than twice the expected financial gains that were communicated
n the informational intervention (CHF 390 energy savings per year, or CHF 5850 for 15-year undiscounted, 2017 energy
rices). This suggests that homeowners also consider non-monetary benefits when evaluating energy efficiency investments.
s expected, we observe no impacts on WTP  for alternative technologies.
Lastly, columns (6) and (7) show that informing homeowners about carbon tax payments associated with fossil fuel-
ased technologies (treatment conditions TC and TD) has no statistically significant effect on average WTP  for lower-carbon
echnologies. This result is also illustrated in Fig. 4, panels (c–e). It shows that even after being informed about environmental
enefits of low-carbon technologies, homeowners are on average unwilling to pay associated cost premiums (CHF 15,000 for
ood pellets and air source heat pumps relative to oil, and CHF 40,000 for ground source heat pumps, see EnergieSchweiz,
020). Unexpectedly, treatment condition TC decreases respondents’ WTP  for energy labels A and A+ (column 6), although
his effect vanishes once carbon tax payments are made salient (condition TD, column 7).16 In Appendix C, Fig. C1, we  explore potential drivers of the observed heterogeneity. In particular, we  display boxplots for simulated individual-specific
TP  before treatment, separated by alternative sets of household characteristics (i.e., by age, education, income, dwelling size, individual metering, and
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.2. Pre-treatment preferences and the role of familiarity
In Fig. 5, we report kernel densities for simulated individual-specific WTP  before treatment, with median WTP  indicated
s a vertical bar. For each attribute, we condition on the pre-existing heating technology of participants (oil, natural gas,
r others).17 Panels (a) and (b) show pre-treatment WTP  for energy efficiency grades A and A+ (relative to B), respectively.
anel (c) displays pre-treatment WTP  for natural gas (relative to heating oil), whereas panels (d) and (e) focus respectively
n wood pellets and heat pumps.
Panels (a) and (b) of Fig. 5 show that heating oil and natural gas users’ preferences for energy efficiency are close to
hose of the remainder of the sample. By contrast, panels (c) to (e) with simulated WTP  for heating technologies show
ignificant variations across pre-existing technologies. Specifically, median WTP  estimates suggest that users value pre-
xisting technologies significantly more than alternatives, with a substantial portion of gas, wood, and heat pump users
avoring the more familiar technology. This is consistent with the previously cited status quo or familiarity effect inherent
n homeowners’ heating technology choices. Quantitatively, about 80% of both natural gas users and heat pump users are
illing to pay the expected market premium for the familiar technology relative to oil (no premium for gas and CHF 15,000
or air source heat pumps), whereas the same is true for about 40% of wood users (CHF 15,000 differential) and 20% of heat
ump users with respect to ground source heat pumps (CHF 40,000 differential, see EnergieSchweiz, 2020).
One important finding is that oil users’ median WTP  to switch to other, lower-carbon technologies is either negative or
lose to zero in all cases. Moreover, the simulated distribution for these owners is slightly more dispersed toward lower
aluations than that of non-oil users. Importantly, only about 30% of oil users are willing to pay more for a boiler operating
n natural gas compared to the familiar technology. About 20% are willing to cover the expected investment cost premium
or an air source heat pump and about 10% for a wood pellet-based boiler (CHF 15,000 differential each, see EnergieSchweiz,
020). Finally, less than 5% of oil users consent to cover the extra investment associated with a ground source heat pump
CHF 40,000). This confirms a certain unwillingness to switch technology among a large proportion of oil users as well.18
.3. WTP  results for fossil fuel users and technology subsidy
We  now focus on preferences and informational treatment effects pertaining to respondents whose pre-existing tech-
ology uses fossil fuels. MXL  regression results reported in Table 4, based on equation (3), only consider the DCE response
ata of homeowners who currently heat their dwelling with heating oil or natural gas (N = 386). The structure of the table
ollows the logic of Table 3.
Fossil fuels users’ WTP  for energy efficiency labels reported in column (1) are comparable with those derived from the
ain sample: CHF 8410 for energy label A relative to B, and CHF 11,780 for label A+. The same is true for natural gas (CHF
300 relative to heating oil). By contrast, fossil fuel users display a lower average WTP  for wood pellet-based heating systems
CHF −2630 compared to CHF 10 in Table 3), and a lower average WTP  for heat pumps (CHF 4430 compared to CHF 10,350
n Table 3). These results are consistent with the discussion in the previous section. The coefficient for investment cost and
he standard deviation estimates reported in column (2) are also very similar to those for the main sample.
Turning to the effect of the informational interventions, column (3) shows that fossil fuel users are barely affected by
he control intervention (C), and information about heating cost savings (treatment conditions TA and TB) has no significant
mpact on WTP  for energy efficiency (columns 4 and 5). Similar to the main sample, WTP  for energy label A+ (relative to
) amounts to over CHF 13,000 after being exposed to conditions TA and TB, which is more than double the communicated
eating cost savings (CHF 390 energy savings per year, or CHF 5850 for 15-year undiscounted, 2017 energy prices). Instead,
eating cost treatments increase average WTP  for wood pellet-based boilers (relative to heating oil) by CHF 5400 (column
, p-value < 0.05) and CHF 4060 (column 5, p-value < 0.1). The increase is, however, relatively small as compared to the
tandard deviation of the WTP  distribution (see Appendix C, Fig. C2).
Information about carbon tax payments levied on fossil fuels (treatment conditions TC and TD) tend to increase WTP  for
ow-carbon solutions. Specifically, average WTP  for wood pellet-based solutions (relative to heating oil) increases by CHF
060 (column 6) and CHF 7010 (column 7) depending on salience. The average treatment effect on WTP  for heat pumps
relative to oil) is CHF 4050 (p-value < 0.1). However, Appendix C, Fig. C2, again illustrates that overall the differences in
agnitudes between pre-treatment and post-treatment WTP  are small.
Next, we use the coefficient estimates reported in Table 4 to predict choice probabilities for alternative heating replace-ent scenarios. These are summarized in Table 5. In scenario 1, we  predict fossil fuel users’ probability of choosing a highly
fficient (energy label A+) wood pellet-based heating system over a cheap (CHF 20,000 investment cost), standard (energy
abel B) oil-based alternative, at various levels of investment cost associated with the wood pellet boiler. In a second step,
17 The subcategory “Others” is composed of different user categories, namely wood pellets, heat pump, and electricity for panels (a–c), natural gas, heat
ump, and electricity for panel (d), and natural gas, wood pellets, and electricity for panel (e).
18 Given that average age in our sample is relatively high in comparison to the general population, reflecting the fact that we focus on homeowners, one
ypothesis we  have tested is whether preferences for the pre-existing technology are different for younger and older respondents. However, we did not
nd  significant differences in the distribution of WTP  in that dimension.
13
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Fig. 5. Pre-treatment distributions of simulated individual-specific WTP  by pre-existing heating technology. Notes: Each kernel density estimate uses
Epanechnikov kernel function with an optimal bandwidth. The vertical lines represent the corresponding estimates for the median. 2017 exchange rate
CHF  1 ≈ USD 1.
14
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Table  4




Interaction effects (post-treatment estimates)
Mean Std. dev. Post Heating cost Heating cost salient CO2 tax CO2 tax salient
×Pt ×Pt · TA ×Pt · TB ×Pt · TC ×Pt · TD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Energy label A 8.41*** 8.04*** 0.44 −1.60 2.20 −4.49* −1.13
(0.70) (0.69) (1.65) (2.09) (2.18) (2.45) (2.14)
Energy label A+ 11.78*** 11.45*** 2.73* −0.61 3.70 −5.62*** −1.06
(0.87) (0.83) (1.46) (1.85) (3.18) (1.96) (2.04)
Natural gas 3.30*** 23.74*** −1.41 1.24 −1.28 2.00 0.65
(0.94) (2.49) (2.16) (2.51) (2.54) (2.60) (3.16)
Wood  pellets −2.63*** 20.24*** −2.77 5.40** 4.06* 5.06** 7.01**
(1.02) (1.67) (1.94) (2.30) (2.35) (2.46) (3.32)
Heat  pump 4.43*** 17.66*** 1.09 1.54 −3.57 4.05* −1.00
(0.81) (1.39) (1.64) (2.24) (3.23) (2.38) (2.88)
Investment cost −1.33*** 0.83*** – – – – –







Notes: MXL estimation for the sample of oil and natural gas users. Column (1) reports pre-treatment mean WTP  estimates (in thousands CHF), and column
(2)  displays corresponding standard deviation estimates. Reference categories for the energy labels (A, A+) and the technology variables (natural gas, wood
pellets, heat pump) are energy label B and heating oil, respectively. Column (3) reports (mean) interaction effects of each attribute with a post-treatment
indicator variable. Column (4) reports interaction effects of each attribute with a post-treatment indicator specific for treatment condition TA (=1 if the
choice  is made after being subject to treatment condition TA). Columns (5–7) report interaction effects for treatment conditions TB , TC , and TD , respectively.
2017 exchange rate CHF 1 ≈ USD 1. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent-level and reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Table 5
Selected heating replacement scenarios.
Standard heating system Low-carbon alternative
Energy label B B A+ A+
Heating technology Boiler with heating oil Boiler with natural gas Boiler with wood pellets Heat pump using electricity



















Scenario 1 and 2 3 and 4 1 and 3 2 and 4
otes: 2017 exchange rate CHF 1 ≈ USD 1.
e replace the wood pellet boiler with a heat pump using electricity (scenario 2). In a third step, we  replace the oil-based
eference scenario with a boiler operating on natural gas (scenarios 3 and 4).
We illustrate the resulting predictions for scenarios 1 and 2 in Fig. 6, panel (a). Specifically, we  plot fossil fuel users’
redicted probability of choosing a highly efficient (energy label A+) low-carbon heating system over a relatively cheap
CHF 20,000 investment cost), standard (energy label B) oil-based alternative, as a function of the investment cost associated
ith the low-carbon alternative. This shows that the probability of selecting the low-carbon solution falls below 50% at an
nvestment cost of CHF 29,000 for wood pellets and CHF 36,000 for heat pumps.
Fig. 6, panel (b), displays the same functions for a choice between a standard (energy label B) heating system operating on
atural gas at CHF 20,000 investment cost and an efficient option based on either wood pellets or heat pump (scenarios 3 and
). In this case, the predicted probability of switching to the efficient low-carbon solution falls below 50% at an investment
ost of CHF 25,000 for wood pellets and CHF 32,000 for heat pumps.
Comparing these results with current market prices is indicative of the level of subsidy that would incentivize fossil
uel users to invest in low-carbon technologies. In our setting, EnergieSchweiz (2020) reports that oil-based and gas-based
eating systems cost approx. CHF 20,000, CHF 35,000 for wood pellet-based heating systems and air source heat pumps,
nd CHF 60,000 for ground source heat pumps. These data suggest that phasing out heating oil would require subsidies of
bout CHF 6000 for wood pellets (scenario 1) and CHF 24,000 for ground source heat pumps (scenario 2), whereas air source
eat pumps do not require additional incentives (scenario 2). By contrast, moving away from natural gas calls for a public
ubsidy of about CHF 10,000 for wood pellets (scenario 3), CHF 28,000 for ground source heat pumps (scenario 4), and CHF
000 for air source heat pumps (scenario 4).
Lastly, we note that our information treatments suggest that informing fossil fuel users about CO2 tax payments has the
otential to reduce the size of the required public subsidy for low-carbon alternatives. While the reduction associated with
15
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Fig. 6. Fossil fuel users’ predicted probability to choose highly efficient low-carbon heating system (before treatment). Notes: The graph depicts the predicted































ost  of the low-carbon solution. See Table 5 for the definition of the scenarios. 2017 exchange rate CHF 1 ≈ USD 1.
he required subsidy for ground source heat pumps is relatively low in magnitude (air source heat pumps do not require
dditional incentives), our results show that salient information about the carbon tax might eliminate the need for additional
nancial incentives promoting wood pellets.
. Discussion and conclusion
In order to meet stringent CO2 abatement targets, homeowners are expected to invest in energy efficiency and low-
arbon energy sources. However, while these types of investments have the potential to substantially reduce CO2 emissions,
he level of realized investment remains low. In this paper, we conducted a DCE on a sample of 511 Swiss homeowners to
stimate their valuation of various product attributes related to alternative replacement heating appliances, and study how
hey respond to informational interventions laying out financial implications of their choices.
In a nutshell, our findings suggest that homeowners are willing to invest on average CHF 7970 (2017 exchange rate CHF
 ≈ USD 1) for efficiency class A and CHF 13,250 for class A+ (both relative to B). While homeowners’ WTP  for label A+ can
e increased slightly with salient information on heating costs (by CHF 4400 on average), WTP  of fossil fuel users is not
ffected by information. This could suggest that a significant share of respondents is already well informed about expected
nergy savings, which is in line with recent literature challenging the importance of imperfect information and inattention
or energy efficiency investment decisions (Allcott and Wozny, 2014; Jacobsen, 2015; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015). But in
ur case, we cannot rule that this is a specific feature of the participants in our survey.
We further identify large heterogeneity in preferences for different heating technologies (i.e., heating oil, natural gas,
ood pellets, and heat pump), with a significant share of respondents experiencing disutility from switching to a technology
hat is different from the one currently installed at their home. In particular, our results suggest that fossil fuel users are
ot willing to pay investment cost differentials associated with low-carbon technologies, as their average WTP  to switch to
ood pellets or heat pumps (both relative to heating oil) is CHF −2630 and CHF 4430, respectively. Moreover, while fossil
uel users’ preferences are only weakly affected by information about CO2 tax payments, the interventions have the potential
o reduce the need for subsidies promoting low-carbon choices (by CHF 5060–7010 for wood pellets and CHF 4050 for heat
umps on average).
In view of reducing CO2 emissions from residential space heating, our findings provide useful insights for effective policy
esign. On the one hand, it seems that homeowners value energy efficiency beyond simply financial returns on average,
nd that there is limited potential to correct imperfect information market failure and attentional biases with information
rograms targeting private and pro-social consequences of choices (note that this conclusion likely does not extend to
enants, see Myers, 2020; Lang and Lanz, 2021). On the other hand, fossil fuel users might be unwilling to invest in low-
arbon technologies simply because they hold strong and persistent preferences towards the familiar technology. As a
esult, promoting and incentivizing specific low-carbon technologies might be more effective than subsidizing appliances
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ppendix A. Experimental script
Fig. A1. Introductory screen 1.Fig. A2. Introductory screen 2.
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Fig. A3. Introductory screen 3.Fig. A4. Introductory screen 4.
18
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Fig. A5. Example pre-treatment choice task.
Fig. A6. Instructions for information screens (C).
Fig. A7. Instructions for information screens (TA and TB).Fig. A8. Instructions for information screens (TC and TD).
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Fig. A14. Instructions for post-treatment choice task with heating costs and CO2 tax (TD).Fig. A15. Instructions for post-treatment choice task (C, TA-TD).
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Fig. A16. Example post-treatment choice task – Heating cost (TB).
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ppendix B. Sample composition
able B1
ummary statistics for the sample of homeowners.
N Mean Std. dev. Min  Max
Age (in years) 511 55.79 (13.52) 21.00 85.00
University indicator 511 0.44 (0.50) 0.00 1.00
Household incomea 443 4.46 (1.16) 1.00 6.00
Dwelling size (in m2) 508 171.87 (84.84) 10.00 999.00
Oil  heating indicator 511 0.47 (0.50) 0.00 1.00
Gas  heating indicator 511 0.29 (0.45) 0.00 1.00
Individual meter for heating 511 0.86 (0.35) 0.00 1.00
Annual  heating costs (in CHF)b 198 1919.54 (963.75) 250.00 5500.00
a Monthly gross household income is coded as: 1 – CHF 3000 or less; 2 – CHF 3000–4459; 3 – CHF 4500–5999; 4 – CHF 6000–8999; 5 – CHF 9000–12,000;
 – CHF 12,000 or more.
b Annual household expenditures for heating, as per the latest energy bill available.
able B2
ummary statistics across control and treatment conditions.
C TA TB TC TD
Age (in years) 55.16 56.42 56.45 54.58 56.17
University indicator 0.51 0.45 0.37 0.43 0.44
Household incomea 4.53 4.22 4.70 4.42 4.48
Dwelling size (in m2) 165.96 175.63 168.26 170.15 179.72
Oil  heating indicator 0.52 0.44 0.55 0.37 0.43
Gas  heating indicator 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.37
Individual meter for heating 0.86 0.79 0.88 0.88 0.89
Annual  heating costs (in CHF)b 1688.63 1883.52 1881.04 2082.16 2038.55
Observations 103 100 104 97 106
a Monthly gross household income is coded as: 1 – CHF 3000 or less; 2 – CHF 3000–4459; 3 – CHF 4500–5999; 4 – CHF 6000–8999; 5 – CHF 9000–12,000;
 – CHF 12,000 or more.
b Annual household expenditures for heating, as per the latest energy bill available.ppendix C. Additional figures
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/
.reseneeco.2021.101231.
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Fig. C1. Distributions of simulated individual-specific WTP  by household characteristics (before treatment). Notes: The boxplots summarize the distribution
of  simulated individual-specific WTP  before treatment separately for various subsamples. The lines in the box represent the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile,
while the whiskers extend to include lower and upper adjacent values to the respective quartiles. 2017 exchange rate CHF 1 ≈ USD 1.
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Fig. C2. Distributions of fossil fuel users’ simulated individual-specific WTP  by treatment status. Notes: The boxplots summarize the distribution of simulated
individual-specific WTP  before and after treatment, where the latter are conditioned on treatment conditions. Only current heating oil and natural gas
users  are included. The lines in the box represent the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, while the whiskers extend to include lower and upper adjacent values
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